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All Suffer the Affliction of the
One: Metaphysical Holism and
the Presence of the Spirit
By Brad J. Kallenberg
When Copernicus and Galileo proposed that the earth circled the sun and not the
other way around, Christian believers faced the difficult prospect of surrendering a
long-held belief that had seemingly undeniable support from the biblical text. After all, Joshua reported that the sun, not the earth, stood still; what could this mean
if not that the sun orbited the earth? Today, centuries later, believers unanimously
hold a heliocentric view of the solar system and are somewhat embarrassed by the
ignorance of our pre-Enlightenment brothers and sisters. Ironically, however, such
embarrassment masks the possibility that we ourselves may one day be found guilty
of having held notions yet to be realized as "backwards."
We face just such a possibility with our conception of the Holy Spirit's presence. It is my suspicion that, contrary to some of our most trenchant modern sensibilities, we are mistaken when we construe the presence of the Spirit in largely
individualistic terms. Yet in this case, it is not the biblical text that is misleading. In
contrast, a close inspection of the biblical record and of its earliest interpreters reVeals that the earliest Christians naturally tmderstood the presence of God's Spirit
primarily in corporate rather than individualistic terms.
The holism that marks first- and second-century conceptions of commw'li.ty
life tends to strike our modern ears as a form of primitive hocus-pocus. However,
Very recent discussions of"emergence" and "supervenience" in philosophical circles
may provide us moderns with the conceptual resources necessary for better owning the biblical record. In this paper, I will argue that biblical notions of the Spirit's
"indwelling" and "filling" ought to be primarily understood as descriptive of the
Spirit's relation to the believing community and perhaps only secondarily in rela-

Since the Enlightenment, systematic theologies have almost invariably described the Holy
Spirit in terms of an interface between God and huma11 individuals qua individuals. Since the
biblical text leans the other way, there are good reasons for seeking out better conceptual
resolU·ces for understanding the presence of the Holy Spirit than can be offered by reductive
theories of metaphysics that became so influential in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This paper surveys recent work in supervenience and emergentism in order to suggest
Ways for recapturing a more holistic, which is to say more biblical, pneumatology. Brad J.
l<aUenberg is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Dayton.
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tion to believing individuals. I begin by examining the biblical texts and the witness
of the second-century apologists. I then proceed to summarize philosophical discussions regarding emergence and supervenience. I end with a suggestion that we
can recover the biblical sense more fully by appropriating the language of emergence and supervenience: (1) the Body of Christ emerges from the system of individuals living under a particular form of life; and thal (2) descriptions of the Holy
Spirit's presence supervenes upon descriptions of this particular form of communal
living.

Holism in the Biblical Text
Paul writes to the motley group of believers in Corinth that "there are many
members, yet one body." Moreover, God has so arranged this body that "if one
member suffers, all suffer together with it ... " 1 It is difficult to convey the strength
with which Paul writes this last sentence. He does not say that members of a believing community ought to suffer with one of their afflicted members, or that the affliction of the one is grounds for empathy and sacrificial care. Ratl1er, he uses an indicative verb to express a fact: all suffer the affliction of the one. Paul's language is clear on
this point: the body of Christ is so constituted that no individual member canescape affecting or being affected by the condition of the rest. 2
Now, I am puzzled by this, not by Paul's view of the body, but by the curious
fact that contemporary believers who take biblical texts very seriously display a
consistent tendency to conceive the action of God's Spirit in individualistic terms.
To cite but one example, Millard Erickson construes the corporate action of the Holy
Spirit as exhausted by the piecemeal distribution of spiritual gifts to individuals.
Erickson consistently emphasizes the primacy of the Holy Spirit's action toward
individuals: "The work of the Holy Spirit is of special interest to Christians, for it is
particularly through this work that God is personally involved and active in the life
of the believer." 3 In Erickson's eyes, the Holy Spirit initiates the individual into the
Christian life by playing the dominant role both in conversion, which he calls "the
individual's turning to God," and regeneration, which he defines as "the miraculous
transformation of the individual and implantation of spiritual energy." 4

1

1 Cor. 12:20, 26, NRSV.
Stanley Hauerwas observes that "our normal reading of I Corinthians 12:12-25 as a 'metaphor' is a mistake. lt is not as if the dlllrch is, like the body, interconnected, needing all its
parts even the inferior one. The church is the body from which we learn to understand out
particular bodies." See his "The Sanctified Body: Why Perfection Does Not Require a 'Self',"
in SallclifiJ The11r in the Truth (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1998), 82. For recent helpful exegesis
on the non metaphorical use of "body" in the Corinthian correspondence, see Dale B. Martin,
The Corinthia11 Body (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995).
3
Millard J. Erickson, Introducing Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1992),
265, emphasis added.
4
Erickson, Introducing Christian Doctrine, 268, emphasis added.

2

---
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I take Erickson's views as symptomatic of a broader pattern of individualism
in contemporary theological conversations. I suspect that we are so thoroughly
steeped in individualism that we have great difficulty even imagining what
pneumatology could be about if not about the empowerment of the individual. Yet
consider an alternative reading of the biblical record.
When Jesus was questioned by the Pharisees as to the details of the coming
kingdom, he responded with the words, "The Kingdom of God is ... within you."
Or did he say, rather, "in your m.idst"?5 We rightly object on theological grounds
that the kingdom ever be considered "within you," since Jesus' original audience
included, among others, his nemeses tl1e Pharisees. Rather, Jesus seems to be intimating that he himself was the embodiment of the kingdom who stood in the midst
of the those who interrogated him. Unfortunately; tlus reading strategy appears to
be an exception to our more general exegetical practice. What I find most puzzling
is the instinctive way we assume that phrases such as evto<; Uf..l&V or t:v Uf..ltV ought
to be translated as "within each of you" rather than "in the midst of you all." For
example, the NASB translates Romans 8:9 as, " ... you are not in tl1e flesh but in tl1e
Spirit, if indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you." Here again the Greek pronouns
are plural-as they nearly always are-and therefore, the text is probably better
rendered in the plural: "you all are not in the flesh but in the Spirit if indeed the
Spirit of God dwells in the midst of you all."
I am not denying that the Spirit indwells and fills individuals. Peter, after all,
was full of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost. What I am questioning is whether in
the long run the notion of "individual filling" makes any sense at all when treated
in isolation from the commtmal form of life that is conceptually linked with the
corporate filling of the Spirit.
Consider Paul's letter to the Ephesians. Believers typically turn to 5:18 as the
locus c/assiws for individualized Spirit-filling. However, note tl1at the notion of Spiritfilling there is qualified by five participles, the first and last of which-namely speaking and subjecting-are especially bound up with intracommw1alliving. Apparently, believers cannot be filled with the Spirit apart from speaking and acting in a
certain mmmer toward others. 6 Moreover, the object of Paul's address is plural: "Be
you all filled with the Spirit." Since tlus is a corporate command, are we not obligated on textual grounds at least to entertain the possibility that the content of the
action envisioned is likewise corporate in nature? After all, Paul rarely concerns
himself with "new persons" but with a singular "new person." Recent New Testament scholarship confirms fuat the Pauline "new person" in Ephesians is not a new
nature internal to each regenerate individual, but a new corporate personality spelled
out most clearly in chapter 2: Christ himself is the commtmal peace having made
5Luke 17:21.
6Qne might respond that the Spirit's filling of an individual is logically prior to changes in
behavior and speech. Yet is this the emphasis of the text? It seems to me that the text assumes
that filling ru1d acting are internally related, two sides of the same coin, neither of which can
be rendered logica lly (nor chronologically) prior to the other.
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out of both groups-Jews and Gentiles-one new corporate person (i!vo. KO.tvov
O.vepwnov). The reality of this new entity has radical implications for the individual.
An individual does not possess identity solely on the basis of his or her difference
from others but on the basis of his or her connection with them. Thus, believers are
each members of one another (4:25) by virtue of the new reality, the church, which
Paul identifies as Jesus' "body, the fullness of Him who fills all in all" (1:23).7 As a
whole, this body constitutes the temple of God's Spirit who indwells-not the bricksbut the building as a whole (1:21, 22).
Similar lines of reasoning might be teased out of other Pauline passages. For
example, Luke Timothy Johnson argues helpfully that Paul's concep t of practical
wisdom (prudence-Q>pov£tv and its cognates) demands that we see pneumatology
as internally related to Christian moral behavior within the believing commu.nity8
Likewise, Richard Hays, commenting on Romans 12, writes,
the primary sphere of moral concern is not the character of the individual, but the corpora te
obedience of the church. Paul's formu lation in Romans 12:1-2 encapsulates the vision: "Present
your bodies (s0111nfn, plural) as a living sacrifice (thysinu, singul ar) holy and well pleasing to
God . And do not be conformed to this age, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind
. .. "The commu nity, in its co rporate life, is ca lled to embody an alte rnative order that stands
as a sign of God's redemptive purposes in the wo rld 9

This emphasis on the corpora te presence of the Spirit makes sense out of the
earlies t apologists' employment of descriptions of the believing corrununity in order to trump all objections raised against Christianity. Consider a concrete example
excerpted from the pages of a second century apology written by Aristides to Caesar Hadrian,
But the Christians .. . show ki ndness to those ncar them; and whenever they are judges, they
judge upri ghtly .. . they do good to their enemies .. . if one of them have bondsmen and
bondswomcn or children, through love towa rds them they persuad e them to become Christi ans, and when they have done so, they ca ll them brethren without distinction. They do not
worship strange gods, and they go their way in all modesty a nd cheerfulness. Fa lsehood is
7

NASV. Perhaps the phrase 1:0 nA.Jipw!la 1:0\l 1:a navta i:v miow nA.!]pOWLEvou might be illumina ted by th e paraplu·ase: " the one filling each by virtue of fiiJin g all."
BLuke Timothy Johnson, "Transformati on of th e Mind and Moral Behavior in Pau l" (paper
presented at the AAR, San Francisco, CA, 1997).
9
Richard B. Hays, "Ecclesiology and Ethics in I Corin thians," Ex A udit1110 (1994): 33. A third
exa mple of su pporting biblical scholarship ca n be found in Dale Martin's recent The Corinthian
Body. Martin claims to have uncovered a more compl ica ted und erstanding held by ea rl y Christians regarding the relation between ind ividual believers and the believ ing community than
is typically expressed within co ntemporary theology. Rather th an construe th e community as
constituted by its members, first-century believers likely considered their indi viduality as
constituted by the Body of Christ. See Dale B. Martin, The Coriuthin11 Body (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1995). For a theological-ethica l a ppropriation of this concept
by Stanley I-lauerwas, see "What Could It Mea n for the Church to Be Christ's Body? A Question without a Clea r Answer," in /11 Good Co111pn11y: The Church ns Polis (Notre Dame, IN: University of No tre Dame Press, 1994/1995), 19-32.
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not found among them; and they love one another ... And he, who has, gives to him who has
not, without boasting. And when they sec a sh·anger, they take him in to their own homes
and rejoice over him as a very brother ... And if they hear that one of their number is imprisoned or afflicted on account of the name of their Messiah, all of them anxiously minister to
his necessity ... And if there is any among them that is poor and needy, and they have no
spare food, they fast two or three days in order to supply to the needy their lack of food ...
Such, 0 King ... is their mrumer of life ... And verily, this is a new people, and tl1ere is something
divine in the midst ofthem. 10

Apparently, Aristides felt that he could not speak intelligibly of the Spirit's presence without preceding this tmdefined notion with several pages of text describing
the manner in which Christians lived with each other.
Ludwig Wittgenstein may shed some light here: "the wotds you utter or what
you think as you utter them are not what matters, so much as the difference they
make at various points in your life .. . Practice gives the words their sense."'' If I
read Wittgenstein correctly, the pair of statements "Behold, how they love one another!" and "God is among them" are not descriptions of two states of affairs that
stand in causal relation to each other; they are two sides of the same coin. The cash
value of talk about divine presence is precisely that of talk about a Christlike manner of living. We are only fooling ourselves (not to mention attempting to fool outsiders) when we maintain in the absence of concrete practical differences between
our community and others' that, nevertheless, talk about the Spirit's presence must
mean "something." No. If our theology is to resonate with the New Testament and
second century apologists, we must grow1d our pneuma to logical statements in concrete descriptions of commw1ity life.
To sum thus far, the earliest Christ-followers moved effortlessly between descriptions of community life and descriptions of the Spirit's presence precisely because they understood these descriptions to be internally related. Just as faith was
embodied in action, so too the Spirit's presence was embodied in the hurly-burly of
the christomorphic community. Perhaps our fluency in this earlier, richer, biblical
language of the Spirit's corporate presence has atrophied, while our modern penchant to construe fundamental spiritual realities in primarily individualistic terms
has grown overly strong. Speculation as to why or when this fluency was lost is
outside the scope of this paper. However, I suggest that recent discussions in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science may provide us with conceptual resources for enriching our language once more. It is to a summary of these discussions that I turn next.

lDAristides, "The Apology of Aristides the Philosopher," in The Ante-Nicene Fathers (First Series). Original Supplement to the American Edition, Volume 10, ed. Allan Menzies (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1965), 276-278. Emphasis added.
II Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture nnd Value, ed. G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans.
Peter Winch, English translation with the amended 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell,
1980), 85e.
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Metaphysical Holism
Metaphysical holism names the school of thought that resists the modern urgl:'
to explain complex wholes simply in terms of their parts. Molecules, holists aver,
are more than the sum of their constitutive atoms; human beings are more than t]1'\'
collection of their respective cells; communities are more than the aggregation Of
their members. Since the nineteenth century, this resistance has taken two forms.ltt
the case of "emergentism," something real is thought to emerge when a systel1\
reaches a certain level of complexity giving the emergent reality (the whole) real
downward influence over its members. In the case of "nonreductive physicalisrn,''
descriptions of the systematic whole are said to supervene in an irreducible way ott
descriptions of the parts. Both notions, emergence and supervenience, may profit,
ably illuminate aspects of pneumatology that seem overlooked today.

Emergence
Emergentism is a version of metaphysical holism born of nineteenth century
romanticism. Like the Romantics, emergentists were unhappy with the scientifk
(which is to say, deterministic) descriptions of the world that seemingly precludeq
the possibility of real novelty. Unlike the Romantics, emergentists did not th.in.h:
that real novelty indicated an intrusion into the material world by an immaterial
property, force, or entity. (Belief in such an invasion is called "vitalism.") Consequently, emergentists tried to retain the spontaneity and creativity of romanticism
but edged away from the romantic notion of vitalism.
In his poem "The Metamorphosis of Plants," the Romantic thinker Johann W.
von Goethe portrays "Life" as an animating force that throbs in the life cycle of
flowering plants.12 His perception of a perduring vitality enabled Goethe to classify all the parts of the plant, as well as phases of its life, as different modes of this
single life force. 1:1 At the turn of the twentieth century, Oswald Spengler applied
Goethe's romantic vision to an analysis of culture. In Spengler's mind, science inevitably describes the world-as-nature in terms of cause-effect pairs that operate on
the microcosmic scale. But when science tries to think macrocosrnically, it unwittingly assumes that the exp!ana tory power of its theorems depends on the integrity
of the entire cause-effect chain linking the present with the past. Thus, for example,
Darwinism must postulate the existence of transitional types between species even
when evidence for these is lacking. For the same reason, turn-of-the-century scientists tended toward reductionism; even properties as significant as "life" and "free
will" were thought to be completely explainable by reference to purely physical
parts in a purely aggregative causal arrangements under the constraints of general

12

}ohann Wolfgang Goethe, "The Metamorphosis of Plants," in The Poems of Goethe (New York:
Lovell, Coryell, & Co., 1882), 289.
13
M. W. Rowe, "Goethe and Wittgenstein," Philosophy 66 (1991): 283-303.
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laws of nature. 14 Spengler objected that such a stance necessarily overlooked the
pulsating presence of the life force that alone provides the real unity of what he
called the world-as-history on the macrocosmic scale. 15 Other roman tics joined
Spengler in envisioning life as a force that manifested its periodicity through the
"forms" embodied in living things-even human culture as a whole. In other words,
not only are individual human beings alive, the species itself has a kind of life cycle,
and human life as a whole is the progressive actualization of the "form" of humanity. Thus, cultures "evolve" in the same way that animal species evolve, namely, by
the spontaneous emergence of new and unrelated modes of life. Spengler contended that
this is the only way to make sense out of the historical fact that empires rise and fall
without transitional types serving as causal links from one empire to another. 16
In this way, the romantic explanation did what scientific reductionism could
not do: give prominence to the apparent interconnectedness of all things living. It
was this explanatory power of romanticism that emergentists sought to preserveyet without all the hocus-pocus associated with vitalism. For example, C. Lloyd
Morgan argued that the steps forward taken by the process of evolution were novel
and in an important sense discontinuous with any real or imagined causal chain,
simply because the emergence of new species is a brute fact; no further explanation
was needed. In terms of cosmogeny, Morgan held that psychophysical events give
rise to life, which give rise to mind and from which emerges spirit, even deity. 17
At stake for all emergentist accounts is the distinction made in the nineteenth
century by J. S. Mill and G. H. Lewes between resultant (sometimes called hereditary
or mechanistic) forms of causation and emergent (or non mechanistic) forms of causation. The former refer to the broadly Hurnean view of nomological regularity, while
the latter signify those that do not succumb to nomological description. 18
14 C. Lloyd Morgan crafted his version of emergent evolution to displace four unacceptable
and rival explanations: vitalism, mechanism, preformationism or substance dualism, and
metaphysical reductionism. I have simplified his list for sake of clarity. See T. A. Gouge, "Emergent Evolution," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan
Publishing & The Free Press, 1965), 2: 472-477.
150swald Spengler, Decline of the West, 2 vols. (New York: Knopf, [1926-8]1946).
165pengler, Decline of the West, II: 32-33.
17Sirnilarly, Samuel Alexander lists five emergent levels: space-time, matter, life, mind, deity.
Later accounts were more circumspect with respect to deity. For example, Hilary Puh1am and
Paul Oppenheim first conceived of a "mereological" ontology that began with elementary
particles whim gave rise to atoms which gave rise to molecules, then cells, multicellular
organisms, biological individuals, and finally, social groups. See Gouge, "Emergent Evolution," 2: 475.
1B
See Achim Stephan, "Emergence-A Systematic View on its Historical Facets," in E111ergence
or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Non reductive Physicnlis111, eds. Ansgar Beckerman, Has
Flohr, and Jaegwon Kim (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992), 25-48. See also
Mario Bunge, Causality; The Place of Causal Principle in Modern Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1959), 17-19, 198-219. Bunge himself complains that romanticism is susceptible to an "organismic view of the block universe, in which there is place neither for chance
nor freedom." On his view, causal determinism "leaves enough holes in the universe to let
chance work as an ontological category" (116). See also Ernest Sosa, "Varieties of Causation,"
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Emergentism enjoyed a brief heyday in the 1920s but fell on tough times with the
advent of quantum physics. 19
However, since the late 1970s, there has been a renaissance of emergentism
occasioned by the inability of reductive physicalists to account adequately for the
apparent causal power, which, for example, the human mind is commonly supposed to exert over the physical world. As Paul Humphreys notes:
For if mental properties are causally impotent vis-a-vis physical properties, the traditional
worry about epiphenomenalism confronts us: What is the point of having them in our ontology if they are idle? Abstract objects escape this worry, for we do not expect them to do causal
work, but mental properties are retained in part because we believe them to affect the course
of the world. 20

Emergentism is once again becoming respectable, although today it is commonly
thought of in connection with the reality of the human mind (vis-a-vis the brain)
rather than the reality of World spirit or Life force or God.
The easiest way to begin getting a handle on contemporary emergentism is to
recall the familiar hierarchy of scientific disciplines. The discipline known as particle physics is distinct from chemistry precisely because it studies a different class
of phenomena, namely, those having to do with sub-atomic particles. Chemistry
cannot be reduced to physics precisely because it studies properties unique to the
molecular, rather than atomic, level of complexity. Of course, some properties, such
as mass, nre simply additive. However, other properties can be thought of as distinctive, unique to a given level of complexity; such are the particular domain of
that scientific discipline. Thus, stereoisomerism (the study of 3-D structural differences between molecules with identical constituent parts) at the level of chemistry
has no analog at the level of physics, because for molecules, but not for sub-atomic
particles, three-dimensional structure is functionally significant (for example," righthanded" vs. "left-handed" enzymes). This fact tempts us to say that a new entity is
being studied at this level of complexity despite the fact that such an entity is made
up entirely of atoms, which is to say, elements that comprise the next lower ontic

in Causation, eds. Ernest Sosa and Michael Tooley (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993),
234-242.
19
See Brian McLaughlin, "The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism," in Emergence or Reductio11?, 49-93; see also R. E. Tully, "Emergence Revisited," in Pmgrnatisnt a11d Purpose: Essays
Presented to Thomas A Goudge, eds. L. W. Sumner, John G. Slater, and Fred Wilson (Toronto &
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 261-277. Unfortunately for the emergentists, C. D.
Broad had built his case for emergentism on what classical physics regarded as the "fact" of
the nonpredictability of chemical properties. However, the advent of quantum mechanics,
with its surprising successes to predict just such properties, fueled relentless attacks on
emergentism by very robust physical reductionists. Eventua lly, emergentism died the death
of a thousand qualifications when Hempel and Oppenheim conceded that in the face of indisputable scientific progress, perhaps emergentism was no more than a stop-gap theory-a
temporary way to talk about matters that would eventually succumb to purely physicalist
explanation.
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order. This mereological picture is repeatable. Moving up: molecules constitute cells,
and properties unique to the cellular level emerge giving justification to biologists'
treatment of cells as "real" in their own right. On this view, the so-called "soft sciences," such as sociology, are seen to lie farther up the same mereological hierarchy
as the hard sciences. In the case of sociology, human individuals constitute a social
group, and the social group instantiates properties unique to that group, a fact that
justifies treating the group as a ca usal entity in its own right. 21
Many (if not all) emergentists will chara cterize the relationship between adjacent levels in the hierarchy with the several features. 22 The most important of these
is downward ca usation: macro-properties have top-down causal influence on the parts
that constitute the system. Thus, mental events have real causal influence on brain
states. 23 Similarly, as Durkhei.m was the first to discover, social facts (namely, group

Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge," Philosophy of Science 64 (Mard1 1997): 2.
additio n to Achim Stephan's essay ci ted above, see Brian McLaughlin, "The Rise and Fall
of British Emergentism," in Emerge11ce or Reduction?, 49-93. See also Arthur R. Peacocke, "Reductionism: A Review of the Epistemological Issues and Their Relevance to Biology and the
Problem of Consciousness," Zygo11 11, no. 4 (Dec 1976): 307-334.
While early versions took an ontological cast, contempora ry expressions of emergentism may
be taken simply as linguistic in form: the concept of emergence is useful for talking about
properties of systems. This avoids on the one h and, the supposed difficulties inherent in
unfa lsifiable ontological commitments and, on the other hand, the difficulty of believing that
each sentence of psyd1ology, for examp le, can be translated into sentences about physical
events (a position called semantic physicalism). Ansgar Beckerman summarizes this latter
problem thus: "Every time we try to explica te th e meaning of the mental ex pression in terms
of behavioral dispositions we find ourselves in the situation th at we cannot formulate the
cond itions of the disposition except by using other mental expressions." Ansgar Beckerman,
"Introduction-Reductive and Nonred uctive Physicalism," in Emerge11ce or Reductio11?, 6.
22 See Stephan, 27-45; McLaughlin, 48-52. There are five features generally mentioned in addition to downward causation. First, nonadditivity: the whole is greater than the arithmeti c
sum of its parts because new properties (perhaps even new entities?) emerge that make each
level of complexity "discontinuous" with the level of its constituen t parts. Mario Bw1ge defines emergence this way: "Let P be a property of a complex thing x other than the composition of x. Then (i) Pis res11ltn11t or hereditary if P is a property of some components of x; (ii)
otherwise, that is, if no component of x possesses P, Pis emergent, collective, systemic or gestalt"
(cited in Steph an, 31). Second, novelty: emergent properties are a function of the complex
and are not instantiated at the level of the parts. For example, there is no analog to wetness
for an isolated HzO molecule. Third, nonpredi ctability: neither the laws whid1 describe the
emergent property nor the laws which describe the regularity of the transition between levels arc deterministic (in the Laplacea n sense). This leaves us necessarily un ab le to discover or
predict these laws prior to empirical observation of the complex. Fourth, nondeducibility:
because one set of base conditions can give rise to a variety of complexes, and, beca use two or
more distinct base conditions ca n realize the "same" emergent property, the emergent property ca nnot be thou ght of as deducible. Fifth, radical epistemological contingency: beca use
emergent properties are nonded ucib le and nonpredictable, we must face the necessarily incomplete state of human knowing. ln a recent essay Paul Humphreys notes that once we
construe the world in terms of levels we open ourselves to the wrongheaded question, "Which
level is more basic th an the others?" Of course this question is simply another version of the
reductionism that emergentists want to disabuse u of. Consequently, Humphreys argues
that we ought to aba ndon the levels model al.togethcr. See Paul Humphreys, "Emergence,
20Pa ul
21ln
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properties such as belonging to a Protestant Church) predisposes individuals in
this group toward certain behaviors (in this instance, toward suicide). 24

A Conceptual Assist from Emergentism
Despite 0ur strong tendency to consider the status of the individual as more
fundamental to the workings and identity of the community than the other way
around, the language of emergence may give us a way to w1derstand the dynamic
relation in which believers stand to the whole: the Body of Christ emerges from the
system of individuals that embodies a particular form of life.
Saying that the Body of Christ emerges from a group of believers whose matrix
of relations is configured in the imitatio Christi has the advantage of emphasizing
the fact that the faithful commw'lity is itself crucial to both the salvation and sanctification of the individual. Augustine's dictum, "Outside the church there is no salvation" (ad extra ecclesiam nulla sa /us), does not make some sort of good work (for
example, church membership) a prerequisite for salvation. It simply states a factthe individual who neglects participation in the new relational configuration that
constitutes the Body of Christ stands outside that which is being saved.
Similarly, an emergentist outlook opens the possibility of top-down influences
by the commw'lity upon the individual members in ways that transcend spiritual
disciplines undertaken on the individual level (such as prayer, Bible reading, fasting, etc.). 25 Negatively stated, the spiritual poverty of the believing community
places, in an important sense, an unavoidable upper limit to the spiritual health of
the individual and beyond which ceiling no member can rise despite a host of isolated efforts on his or her part. 26 Positively stated, the emergent social reality, the
Body of Christ, may exercise top-down persuasiveness on those outsiders that come
within range of its language and life, by showing at the corporate level what simply

Not Supervenience," Philosophy of Science 64 (Proceedings) (March 1997): S337-S345. See also
his essay, "Understanding the Not-So-Special Sciences," Southern joumal of Philosophy 34
(Supplement. Spindel Conference 1995) (March 1995): 99-114.
23
For a neuroscientific defense of downward causation see the works of R.W. Sperry such as
"Discussion: Macro- Vers us Micro-determinism," Philosopl1y of Scie11ce 53 (1986): 265-270. For
a neurobiological ex~mple see Josie Gla usiusz, "The Chemistry of Obsession," Discover, ]Lme
1996, 36. For a philosophical defense see Paul Humphreys, "How Properties Emerge" and
"Emergence, Not Supervenience." For biochemical explanation and defense see ArthW' R.
Peacocke, The Physical Chemistry of Biological Organization (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1983).
24
Daniel Little, Varieties of Social Expla11alio11: An Jntroduclio11 to tile Philosophy of Social Scie11ce
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 189-190.
25
0f course, the opposite scenario is also possible: a deficiency in the form of intra-communal
life exercises a negative top-down influence on its parts. (Surely we call this a dead church.)
26
1 Cor. 12:26 says that the suffering of the one, in fact (note the indicative verb, crwmacrxet),
entails the suffering of the whole. The text does not limit the sort of suffering that is distributed throughout the Body merely to physical or emotional loss. Rather, the point is that believers are mystically-or mereologically-connected within the Body and thus the spiritual
health of each is bound up with the spiritual health of the other and of the whole.
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cannot be snid on the level of the individual. We have already witnessed Aristides'
apologetic strategy of appealing to the remarkable shape of life in the believing
community. A similar example can be f01.md in another second century apologist.
In Athenagoras's mind, truthful description of the Christian community always
trumps any and all objections raised against the gospel:
But among us you will find w1educated persons and artisans, and old women who, if they
are unable in words to prove the benefit of our doctrine, yet by their deeds exhibit the benefit
arising from their persuasion of its truth: they do not rehearse speeches, but exhibit good
works; when struck, they do not strike again; when robbed, they do not go to law; they give
of those who ask of them, and love their neighbors as themselves. 27

Such a strategy is fully commensurate with the Scripture's insistence that the church
is the "pillar and bulwark of the truth," rather than the other way around. 28
The concept of emergence affords the first part of an enriched pneumatology.
If community life is an emergent property that cannot be reduced to the sum of
properties manifested by the parts (in this case, the members of the body), and if
community life has real downward causal power over its constitutive members,
then we are obligated to look at community life tmder an aspect different than that
of merely an aggregative description of individual actions; there is a patternedness
and reality to the whole that must itself display Christlikeness if we are to intelligibly say that the Spirit is present among us .

Supervenience
In addition to claiming that the Body of Christ is an irreducible social reality
that must figure prominently in Christian pneumatology, a second conceptual assist forpneumatology can be found in the notion of "supervenience." The nature of
theological language is such that descriptions of the divine presence carmot simply
hang in space; theological descriptions mean something only when framed by particular linguistic practices within a determinate form of life. I claim, in particular,
that descriptions of the Spirit's presence supervene upon descriptions of the believing community's form of life. In order to unpack the significance of this claim, I
must recount a little history.
If emergentism began with romanticism and edged away from vitalism toward a moderate center, supervenience began at the other extreme, witl1 physicalism, and moved toward the center by edging away from reductionism. The term
was first used by Richard Hare to describe G. E. Moore's contention that a pattern
of human behavior in the physical world can be given a m.oral description; moral
properties car1 be thought to "depend" on physical properties, yet without being

27L. Russ Bush, ed., Classical Readings in Christin11 Apologetics A.D. 100-1800 (Grand Rapids,
Ml: Academie Books, Zondervan Pub lishing House, 1983), 44.
281 Tim. 3:15 NEB.
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reduced to these. 29 For example, we might naturally say: "Mother Teresa gave her
life serving the poor in Calcutta. This is morally good." Did Mother Teresa's moral
property of goodness cause her to behave in ways that she did? Or did her behaving
in such-and-such ways cause her to gain a property called moral goodness? Here,
causal questions are wrongheaded. Rather, we have two ways of describing Mother
Teresa:
a. Mother Teresa gave her life serving the poor in Calcutta. (Physical)
b. Mother Teresa is morally good. (Moral)
Now the question becomes "what is the relationship between these two descriptions? Clearly, we cannot say that the second is entirely independent of the
first. Rather, the second in some sense "depends on" the first for its meaning and
veracity. (If Mother Teresa had lived her life in wanton greed and self-service, it
would not dawn on us even to describe her as morally good.) Moreover, we cannot
speak of this dependence as if it were an entirely accidental feature of this present
social world. We say instead that the "dependence" between the two above clain1s
is strong enough to warrant the assertion that caring for the poor in a manner that
resembles Mother Teresa is always morally commendable-on this or any other conceivable planet.
The notion of supervenience was originally employed to do this job: moral
descriptions supervene on descriptions of physical behavior. However, today the
term "supervenience" appears most frequently in discussions surr01mding the mindbody problem. It was in this context that Donald Davidson resurrected Hare's term
in his own 1970 lecture "Mental Events." 30 Davidson explains that mental event
language supervenes upon descriptions of physical events. This means simply "that
there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but different in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in
some physical respect."31
The central concern appears to be the nature of the relation between mental
properties and physical properties. Is the connection law-like? If so, is this nomological regularity due to a mechanistic connection from physical events (brain states)
to mental ones? If the connection is causal in the ordinary sense, then mental events
reduce to physical events; determinism follows. However, Davidson avoids reductionism by denying that the connection between the physical and the mental is
law-like, hence predictable and deterministic. By "supervenience," he is raising the

29
For a brief history of the concept see Jaegwon Kim, "Concepts of Superven ience," in S11perve11ience a11d Mind, 53-78.
30Davidson's 1970 landmark essay, "Mental Events" is reprinted in Essays 011 Aclions and Events
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1980), 207-225. Davidson's position is most vigorously
explicated (and consequently opposed) by Jaegwon Kim. See his S11perve11ie11ce a11d Mind:
Selected P!Jilosophicnl Essays (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
31
Cited in Ansgar Beckerman, "Introduction- Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism," 11.
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possibility of a nomnechanical "because of" in the following sentence: "individuals
have their mental properties because of their physical properties." 32
But notice what else Davidson is doing by employing the concept of "supervenience": he is framing the discussion in linguistic rather than ontological terms . As
in the case of Mother Teresa, at stake is not the direction of causation-whether her
goodness causes her behavior or vice versa-but rather the nature of the relationship between two complementary descriptions. Similarly here: at stake is not whether
mental events cause brain states or vice versa, but whether the notions of "mind"
and "brain" are in some sense complementary and interdependent descriptions of
human experience. In other words, we must speak of both mental events (for example, intentionality) and brain states (for example, synapse firing) to give a complete description of the events that comprise our lives.

32It is important at this juncture to understand what Davidson is not saying. Davidson has
drawn fire from Jaegwon Kim for utilizing supervenience to defend the reality of both mentality and physicality without envisioning a nomological connection between the two. See
Beckerman, "Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction"; Jaegwon Kim, "The
Nonreductivist's Troubles with Mental Causation," in Superveniencecmd Mind, 336-357, "Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction," in Supervenience and Mind, 309-335, and
'"Downward Causation' in Emergentism and Nomeductive Physicalism," in Emergence or
Reduction?, 119-137. Kim parodies nonreductive physicalists as supposing that "To be real is
to have causal power" (Kim, "Downward Causation," 135). In Kim's view, Davidson, eta/,
"accord full ontological status to emergent properties: not only are they real and genuine
properties of things in the world, in the same se11se in which basic physicoche111icnl properties nre
real, but in some ways they are richer and fuller features of the things they characterize"
(Kim, "Downward Causation," 134; emphasis added). Kim fears that nonreductive physicalists are claiming that mental states do work not done by physical states. This zero-sum game
evidences Kin1's confusion: to say that mental causation works to tile exclusion of physical
causation is the very category fallacy that supervenience seeks to overcome.! suspect that for
Kim the phrase 'mental event' refers to something out there in the real world in a manner no
different than the phrase 'physical event' refers. Given this outlook, Kim must object to
Davidson or else surrender his own physicalist ontology.However, Davidson does not conceive the world as one thing and language as another. (For a discussion of Davidson's views
of language see my "The Gospel Truth of Relativism," in Tile Scottish Journal of Theology 53, no.
2, (2000):177-211). FoUowing Wittgenstein, Davidson views language as constituting, or being internally related to, the human world. Thus, Davidson is free to speak of "reality" in a
variety of language games and also to ask the question of the relationship between the language game of mental events and the language game of brain states. The real issue for
nonreductive physicalists is not a consideration of the relation between properties or entities
as Kim wrongly imagines. Rather, it is a question of the relation between descriptions. Does
this mean that for Davidson the only difference between mental events and brain states is a
"linguistic" one? Wrong question-for that way of putting the objection only has bite for
someone who holds that language corresponds to reality or that language is somehow
ontologicnlly inferior to "reality" in the same way that a photo of me is ontologica lly inferior to
me.
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A Conceptual Assist from Supervenience
Now we are in position to see how the concept of "supervenience" might enrich current pneumatology, especially by helping us overcome our contemporary
penchant to speak of the Spirit's presence in purely individualistic terms. In particular, I suggest that descriptions of the Holy Spirit's presence are of the same sort
as moral claims: they supervene on descriptions of the communal form of life.
In one sense, my appropriation of the language of supervenience (and emergence) may simply be another way of making what Wittgenstein called a "grammatical point." For example, the word "chair" gets a grip in our lives via our multiple activities involving chairs. 33 A "grammatical" mistake in this case would be
expressed by the question, "Is this chair intelligent?" A grammatical remark, then,
is simply a statement that points out that the ways in which we ordinarily use the
word "chair" disallow our speaking of a chair's intelligence. So too, ordinary language prevents us from inquiring about the honesty of the letter "e" or the wetness
of social justice. In the case of pneumatology, the grammatical remark I am trying
to make is that talk of the Spirit's presence may be vacuous unless associated with
a particular shape of community life. What do claims about the Spirit's presence
amount to if not the way believers live with each other?
Please do not mistake what I have tried to say. Discussions of emergentism
and supervenience might be easily and naturally associated with process theology.
However, process thinkers (as well as other versions of panentheism) make ontological claims about the nature of the divine substance that supposedly enables
God to interact with the physical world. In contrast, I am not making an ontological
claim about the divine substance. I am not saying God supervenes upon the community. I am saying that descriptions of God's presence supervene upon descriptions
of the believing community's form of life. In other words, claims such as "God is
here" have determinative meaning if and only if a communal form of life is explicated in the same context.
Why the communal form of life and not that of the individual? Because the
meaningfuh1ess of language depends on the linguistic practices of a community. If
Wittgenstein can be trusted, a sentence's meaning is not some occult thing that
rides piggyback on a striJ g of ocables. Rather, what we call a sentence's meaning
is the use to which it is put within the context of a community's form of life. Thus,
to understand a sentence requires us to look for how the speaking of a given sentence meshes with the rest of life. For example, people are bound to misunderstand
claims about God's forgiveness if these are spoken against a backdrop of a community that fails to practice forgiveness. 34 The practice of forgiveness in community

Wittgenstein wrote, "It is part of the grammar of the word 'chair' that this is what we call 'to
sit on a chair'." The Blue and Browu Books (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 24.
34Mk. 11:25, Mt. 6:16.

33

All Suffer the Affliction of the One: Metaphysical Holism and the Presence of the Spirit

becomes the form of life upon which intelligibility of statements about divine forgiveness hinges.
Irenaeus hinted at what I call the supervenience of the description of the divine presence upon descriptions of the form of communal life when he rejected
Gnostic claims of direct knowledge of God (that is, knowledge unmediated by any
social life). Rather, God and nature (physis) are categorically different. We are unable to know God in se, but we come to know God via the image of God stamped in
various media-namely, Jesus and the believing community. What Irenaeus identified as the "image" of God, then, was the pattern of relationality: the primary pattern was the relationship of Jesus with the Father that became embodied in the
Gospel story; secondarily, the pattern of the intra-trinitarian relationality was reproduced in the Christian community as mutual humility, service, and kenosis.
Thus, while God cannot be known in se, for God is wholly other, the configuration
of this relationality can be described, or better, shown, by the narrative of Jesus and
by the story of historical Christian communities.35 Is not the character of God thought
to be revealed by the way his worshippers sold themselves into slavery to feed the
poor? 36 In Irenaeus's mind, the telos of human existence is salvation, which on his
account is nothing less than the realizing of God's likeness in the realm of human
community. 37
Some may object that my suggestions have mortgaged the farm; my use of
supervenience (in particular) appears to outlaw certain ontological commitments
we hold regarding God. Who can imagine a less satisfying trade than a God who
"does stuff' and to whom we are "personally related" for a set of mere grammatical
points? Fortunately, this dilemma is artificial.
Grammatical remarks gesture toward the real. On the one hand, attention to
the grammar of the conceptual language that believers speak prevents the "refutation" of their claims as if they were empirical propositions. 38 On the other hand,
grammatical points have the power they do because they reflect a "realism without
empiricism."39 The speaking of the Christian language within the context of the
believing community creates and fu lfills the conditions for its own reality: a whole
35 My

exegesis of this point is indebted to Rowan Williams who cites lrenaeus with commentary, "For when the word of God was made flesh, He established both these things: He showed
us the true image [of God in hwnanity] by Himself becoming what was in fact His own
image; and He established and restored the likeness [of humanity to God] by making humanity resemble the invisible Father by means of [His action as] the visible Word." Rowan Williams, The Wound of Knowledge, 2d rev. ed. (Boston, MA: Cowley P ublications, 1990), 29.
36 1 Clement 55:2.
37
Wi lliams, The Wound of Knowledge, 30. Of course, the narrative ofJesus belonged to, and was
the crucial part of, the longer OT narrative of Judaism wh ich gnosticism explicitl y rejected.
38Thls is precisely the sort of advantage logical po iti vists had over turn-of-the-century fundamentalists. See Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism nnd Fundnmenlnlisn1 (Philadelphia, PA:
Trinity Press International, 1996), 36-61.
39 See Brad J. Kallen berg, "Changing the Subject in Postmodernity: Narrative Ethi cs and Philosophical Therapy in the Works of Stanley Hauerwas and Ludwig Wittgenstein" (Ph . D. Dissertation, Fuller Theological Seminary, 1998), 377-387.
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new world (mtv~ nicnc;-2 Cor. 5:17) is created for the community that speaks and
lives thus. Such a linguistic community is itself an emergent reality that gathers up
others into a mode of speaking that is itself partly constitutive of the praxis which
gives sense to its language. In Johannes Fisher's words, "There is a kind of knowledge which is practical in the sense that it does not just state reality but rather first
of all places the perceiving agent into this very reality." 40 Within the form of life
that believers inhabit by grace, they are entitled to robust ontological commitmentsnamely, beliefs in the reality of God's Spirit, of the con'lffitmity, and of oneself. Bridge
builders calculate wave functions and rely on the "reality" of imaginary(!) numbers
to tell them which bridges won't spontaniously collapse. Surely religious believers
are as justified in their commitment to the reality of God's Spirit.'11
An important consequence of a linguistically sensitive pneumatology is the
fact that no clear boundaries need to be drawn between the realm and role of God
and that of human believers. Reinhard Hutter urges that we tmderstand this complicated form of life under the double aspect of paraclesis (exhortation). In other
words, the Apostle's words "You are the body of Christ!" (1 Cor. 12:12) is both a
promise and a claim. Unfortw1ately, we typically dichotomize God's activity and
human activity such that we take the "indicative" as a reference to "God's already
accomplished activity," while taking the "imperative" to name our human activity.
In contrast, Hutter explains that "paradesis thematizes God in the presence and
activity of the parae/etas, the third person of the Trinity, in such a way that our activity is transformed and, at its very best, only joins the Spirit's activity." 42 In this sort of
pneumatology, the distinction between God's activity in the midst of our community and the communal life itself begins to be blurred in a way that rivals the mystery of the trinity.

Conclusion
I think that the notions of emergence and supervenience may prove useful to
discussions of the Spirit's presence in commt.mity on several counts. Most obviously, these two concepts enable us to avoid the language of" causality" and thereby

0
Cited in Reinhard Hutter, "Ecclesial Ethics, the Church's Vocation and Paraclesis," Pro Ecc/esin
2 (fall1993}: 446.
"'W. V. 0. Quine defended augmenting ontology-with gods, irrational numbers, physical
objects, and other "myths"-in order to "simplify our treatment of experience." See "Two
Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60, no. 1 (1951}: 41-42. Daniel Bonevac has
shown that ontological commitments remain intact for speakers of language governed by
supervenient relationships. Only some form of "ontological supervenienc "could eliminate
other ontological commitments, and then only do so by implementing some presupposed
background theory. See Daniel Bonevac, "Reduction in the Mind of God," in Supervenience:
New Essays, ed. Elias E. Savellos and Omit D. Yalc;in (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 133-134.
12
Hi.itter, "Ecclesial Ethics, the Church's Vocation and Paraclesis," 443.
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escape the sorts of confusions so typically prominent in discussions of divine action. 43
Second, this language gives us a way to formulate our beliefs more in keeping
with the historical position of the church. As Clark Pinnock notes, for 1,500 years
the church worshipped God sacramentally by conceiving of a physical side to the
spiritual and a spiritual side to the physical in a way that avoided matter-spirit
dualism.44 They conceived the spiritual and the physical as flowing together, providing them with a robust understanding of God's presence in the sacrament. So
too, Calvin and Luther insisted that God's presence in the Eucharist was more than
mere symbolism. Since Descartes, their views have been considered by some to be
philosophically embarrassing. Yet the notions of supervenience and emergence may
give us a respectable way to reclaim our heritage by showing a way to avoid dichotomizing the physical and the spiritual, on the one hand, and to w1derstand, on
the other hand, that the material and formal conditions for speaking about the Spirit's
presence are broader than mere ritual-they encompass the entire form of communal life.
To say the same thing differently, the notions of emergence and supervenience
are but reminders of the close connection between how believers speak (theology)
and how the church lives (practice). In particular, emergence teaches us that the
whole is real and deserving of attention if we are to "attain ... to a [corporate]
mature man, to the measure of the stature which belongs to the full1ess ofChrist." 45
Supervenience underscores this lesson by reminding us that concrete theological
claims are vacuous unless spoken within arm's length of the community that incarnates, however imperfectly, the story of Jesus.
Finally, the notions of emergence and supervenience give us a way to say what
we have wanted to say all along: the Spirit of God is present "where two or three
are gathered" in a manner that the Spirit is not present with an individual believer.'16
43Th us, 1 am no/ saying that God's presence supervenes upon a certain co1mnw1al form of
life--that is tantamount to pantheism. In my estimation this is exactly the error that Dennis
Biefeldt makes in his article, "God, Physicalism, and Supervenience," The Center for Theology
and the Nat11ml Sciences 15, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 1-12. Likewise, Martin Buber insisted that
relationality is logically prior to existence but because of his w1itarian view of God, he saw
divine relationality as external to God and was therefore forced to conclude that "emergence"
expressed a reciproca l dependence between Creator and creation. See I ar1d Thou, a New Translation with a Prologue "I and You" and Notes by Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), 130-132.
Rather, I am saying that the descriptio11s of God's presence supervene on the description of a
Christomorphic form of comrmmity life; that's the best that we can do. Although I've focused
attention on Davidson in this essay, perhaps R. M. Hare's original usage is closer to what I
mean to employ.
"Pinnock, Flame of Love, 113-147.
45Eph. 4:13 (NASB).
46lt is important to note that Mt. 18:20 begins (postpositively) with gar, thus identifying God's
presence with the communal actions of binding and loosing discussed in vv. 18-19.
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